Canada Can and Must Meet NATO’s Defence Spending Commitments—Here’s how

Much attention has been given to Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent promise to finally meet Canada’s NATO commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on national defence—a target Canada has conspicuously failed to reach since first pledging to do so in 2014. There’s even discussion of increasing this commitment to 5% at an upcoming NATO summit. Historically, Canadian governments—both Liberal and Conservative—have carefully avoided explicitly refusing compliance, instead deflecting attention by emphasizing Canada’s unique contributions to NATO missions and global security efforts.

Indeed, Canada has participated meaningfully in NATO operations over the decades, from missions in the Balkans to recent support efforts in Latvia. Yet, despite these contributions, with the exception of special operations forces, Canada’s military capabilities have eroded significantly, limiting its ability to respond robustly to modern threats.

Various justifications have been provided by governments and analysts for Canada’s reluctance to meet the 2% spending benchmark. Fiscal constraints are frequently cited, with policymakers suggesting defense increases would necessitate politically challenging tax hikes or program cuts. A lack of political will, tied to low voter interest in defense spending, has further allowed successive governments to sidestep meaningful investment. Analysts have also argued that Canada’s geographic proximity and defense alliance with the United States have fostered complacency, reducing urgency for self-reliance. Critics of the 2% figure itself suggest it’s arbitrary and not reflective of actual defense capability, advocating instead for “outcome-based” assessments. Procurement inefficiencies and outdated infrastructure compound these arguments, with the government often indicating increased spending would be ineffective without comprehensive procurement reforms. Additionally, some claim Canada’s defense industry lacks the capacity to absorb rapid funding increases without heavy reliance on imports.

In sum, there is no shortage of excuses, but that’s all they are. Excuses.

It’s a Matter of Choice, Not Cost

Countries much smaller than Canada in both population and GDP like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Albania have all managed to meet or exceed the 2% target. The largest among them is Slovakia with a population of 5.4 million, nominal GDP of $141 billion USD, and a GDP per capita of $25,000 USD. Compare that to Canada, with a population of nearly 41 million, nominal GDP of 2.24 trillion USD, and a GDP per capita of approximately $55,000 USD.

These figures highlight the significant difference in economic scale between the two countries. Despite its smaller economy, Slovakia has managed to meet or exceed the NATO defense spending target of 2% of GDP.

This comparison demonstrates that achieving the NATO benchmark has little to do with the size of a nation’s economy or the cost of such initiatives. Rather, policy decisions and priorities are the culprit.

When politicians and pundits say that Canada can’t afford to meet its NATO commitments, what they are really saying is, we simply don’t want to. Politics and public policy discussions have become chambers of talking points, deflections, and just about anything except for truth and accountability.

To Justin Trudeau’s credit, he was frank with our allies, albeit behind closed doors when he said that Canada had no intention of meeting the 2% spending commitment a little over a year ago. Unfortunately for Trudeau and for Canada, such blatant disregard for Canada’s commitments generated significant animosity among our allies.

Could anyone imagine Trudeau making such a declaration about its Paris climate targets? Surely not. Which brings us back to the one simple point. Increasing defence spending is not a matter of capability. It’s a matter of choice.

Here are some concreate steps Canada can take to increase defence spending quickly, and effectively.

A logical first step would be significantly increasing the salaries of our troops, a measure desperately needed given the rising cost of living. Additionally, Canada’s military recruitment bureaucracy requires immediate and comprehensive reform. During the Afghanistan conflict, some Canadian citizens eager to join the Canadian Armed Forces faced excessive delays—sometimes up to two years. Frustrated, these individuals turned instead to the UK’s Royal Marine Commandos, where their applications were processed and accepted within mere months, placing them quickly into active training overseas. This discrepancy is not due to the UK being less rigorous; rather, it highlights Canada’s overly bureaucratic and inefficient recruiting processes.

Canada should also more readily consider off-the-shelf equipment purchases, a practical approach employed by former Prime Minister Harper with acquisitions like the CC-130J Hercules and C-17 Globemaster aircraft. While long-term investments in Canada’s defense industry remain essential for self-reliance, urgent equipment procurement must prioritize operational effectiveness and troop welfare over domestic job creation. Although supporting local industries is important, it should not lead to decades-long delays and significantly inflated costs for essential military hardware. Canada’s defense procurement strategy must therefore strike a pragmatic balance, ensuring timely and cost-effective outcomes that directly enhance our military capabilities.

What about Canada’s planned purchase of the F-35 Lightening II?

Canada must quickly complete its acquisition of the full complement of 88 F-35 fighters. I understand and support Canada’s growing desire to move away from reliance on the United States for procurement, however, the F-35 is a Joint Fighter program, of which Canada is already an integral member. The contract will provide significant economic advantages, but more importantly, our horrifically slow procurement process means our pilots could be waiting decades instead of  years for new jets. Furthermore, modern air defence threats necessitate fight-generation stealth capabilities to protect our pilots. Why send our pilots into harms way in jets that can be detected by radar, and fired upon, when we can supply them with fighters that are much more difficult to detect? Can we please start thinking about the troops? If we want to continue participating in NATO air missions, and we absolutely should, if we want to continue being a reliable ally, then it behooves us to equip our pilots with the very best, and that means the F-35.

To the naysayers that argue the United States has a kill switch, I say hogwash. If the UK, Australia, and several other NATO allies aren’t deterred by this, then neither should we be. Further, I reject the notion that we would ever have to militarily defend ourselves against the United States. Get real folks. That’s just not going to happen.

But what about the Saab Gripen?

We should buy them too!

Incorporating the Saab JAS 39 Gripen E into the Royal Canadian Air Force would enhance Canada’s capability to fight in the air. We are a large country with a large air space. We need a large air force. The Gripen offers a cost-effective, highly capable, and strategically versatile complement to the F-35, enhancing the RCAF’s operational flexibility.

The Gripen is equipped with the MBDA Meteor missile, a beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) with an operational range exceeding 100 kilometers and a no-escape zone over 60 kilometers. This capability enables the Gripen to engage and neutralize threats, such as Russian bombers, from significant distances, enhancing the RCAF’s defensive posture.

Designed for operations in austere environments, the Gripen E can operate from short, unprepared runways and withstand harsh Arctic conditions. This makes it particularly suitable for defending Canada’s vast northern territories, where infrastructure is limited, and rapid response is critical.

Concerns about maintaining multiple fighter platforms are often overstated. Several NATO allies, including the United Kingdom (operating both F-35s and Typhoons), Germany (Typhoons and Tornados), and Norway (F-35s and F-16s), successfully manage mixed fleets. Canada’s robust aerospace sector is well-equipped to handle the logistics and maintenance associated with a diversified fighter fleet.

Integrating the Gripen alongside the F-35 would provide the RCAF with a balanced mix of stealth and versatility, ensuring readiness across a spectrum of missions. This strategic diversification would enhance Canada’s defense capabilities and reaffirm its commitment to NATO obligations.

These are just a few, relatively quick fixes, off the top of my head that can be implemented which would significantly increase the CAF’s capability which would certainly get us to 2% and even beyond.

Over the Long Term

Longer term initiatives like the River class destroyer, and acquisition of 12 submarines will ensure that our defence spending maintains pace with our NATO commitments while significantly enhancing the CAF’s ability to defend itself and its allies.

If Canada re-aligns its priorities, it absolutely can achieve its NATO defence spending commitments. The UK, France, and Germany all spend 2% or more of their GDP on defence, and the last time I checked, all three countries had robust social programs that rival Canada’s.

Recent concerns over Canadian sovereignty demand we act now. We want to be a truly sovereign nation; we must provide a credible military defence capability. Our future, and indeed that of the rest of the word depends on it.