Michael J. Lalonde, author of The Quiet War Series

Which Submarine Should Canada Buy?

Canada has narrowed its next-generation submarine competition to two boats that represent different philosophies of conventional undersea warfare. The German–Norwegian Type 212CD by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) is a compact, exceptionally quiet design optimized for prolonged covert presence in northern approaches and other complex littorals. South Korea’s KSS-III Batch II by Hanwha Ocean is a larger, blue-water hull with a built-in vertical launch system and the energy budget to carry more weapons and operate farther from home. Both appear to be capable platforms.

Requirements

The first step is to assess what the Government of Canada wants out of its new submarine fleet and what capabilities it will need to achieve its objectives. I’m starting here because there is a common misconception that Canada needs submarines exclusively for Arctic patrol and surveillance, which is false. While it’s true that Arctic sovereignty and security are quite rightfully a preoccupation for the government, patrolling Canada’s Arctic is not the only capability Canada needs out of its new fleet. However, it is the most common argument in favour of a submarine fleet since Arctic sovereignty remains popular within Liberal and Conservative circles alike, along with mainstream media.

Unfortunately, this narrative forces a lopsided conversation about the role these new boats will be expected to play over the coming decades. In addition to Arctic operations, these subs will be expected to deploy far into the North Atlantic with NATO and push across the Pacific to support the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Ottawa’s own defence policy update ties submarine recapitalization to contributions with allies in both theatres.

This implies a blue-water capability, which means these conventionally powered submarines must be able to deploy and fight in the open ocean, far from home ports and daily logistics, for extended periods. This requires long range and endurance for transoceanic transits, sustained submerged persistence through air independent propulsion (AIP) and high-capacity batteries to minimize snorkelling, and habitability and maintenance margins that keep the crew and systems effective past the 30- to 60-day mark. Simply put, the new boats must be able to cross an ocean, remain covert and lethal on station, and deliver effects.

The government further stipulated specific capabilities that the new submarines must have in one of its press releases stating “Through the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), Canada will acquire a larger, modernized submarine fleet to enable the Royal Canadian Navy to covertly detect and deter maritime threats, control our maritime approaches, project power and striking capability further from our shores, and project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts.”

What caught my attention here is the ability to project power and striking capability further from our shores. Power projection is synonymous with a blue-water capability; however, a striking capability, which I take to mean a land strike capability, is not typical for a conventionally powered SSK, which are typically armed only with torpedoes to take out other submarines or surface vessels.

To sum up, Canada’s new subs must be able to:

Patrol the Arctic with under-ice capability year-round
Deploy with NATO in the North Atlantic and support Canada’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific Strategy – A blue-water capability
Remain submerged for three weeks or more at a time
Covertly detect and deter maritime threats
Control Canada’s maritime approaches
A range of 7000 + nautical miles
Project power far from home ports
Anti-surface and subsurface warfare
Land-attack capability via cruise and/or non-nuclear ballistic missiles
Insert Tier-1 special operators on coastal infiltration missions
Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in Canadian maritime approaches and abroad.

With that out of the way, let’s look at what each submarine can do.

German-Norwegian Type 212CD

The 212CD is the follow-on to Germany’s successful 212A, enlarged for greater payload and endurance and co-developed with Norway under a binational program. The program’s Critical Design Review was completed in August 2024, marking the formal end of detailed design and a gateway to full-rate production. In December 2024, the German government expanded its order by four boats, bringing Germany’s total to six, while Norway plans to acquire two more, bringing its total to six, which reduces the risk of Canada getting stuck with another orphan sub. This is a significant advantage because, as we’ve learned, maintaining an orphan fleet like Canada’s current Victoria class is exceedingly complex and expensive due to a lack of spare parts and allied participants for collaboration on future upgrades.

On the sensor and combat-systems side, the 212CD moves fully into the digital periscope era. The optronic suite replaces a traditional hull-penetrating periscope with twin non-penetrating masts, HENSOLDT’s OMS-150 and OMS-300, paired with an i360 panoramic system. That combination allows very short exposure times at periscope depth and multispectral imaging, which helps in poor light and clutter, and it integrates directly with the new ORCCA combat system supplied by the KTA Naval Systems joint venture.

ORCCA is the European off-the-shelf brain for 212CD, built to fuse sonar, optronics, ESM, and navigation data and to exchange a common operating picture with allied units. The navigation and mine-avoidance package from Kongsberg, centred on the SA9510S Mk II and EM2040 MIL echo sounders, gives the boat precise bottom-mapping and hazard warning at slow speed. Those elements together explain why 212-series boats have a reputation for being comfortable in tight, shallow, sensor-dense waters that challenge larger hulls.

The propulsion architecture stays true to the 212 family. A PEM fuel-cell air-independent propulsion module supports long, quiet submerged loitering, extending the amount of time the sub can stay submerged without having to snorkel. Public sources do not publish exact submerged endurance figures for the 212CD, but the smaller 212A’s weeks-long AIP benchmarks and the 212CD’s greater internal volume support a reasonable inference that the new design could stay submerged for up to three weeks before having to recharge its batteries. Having said that, it’s important to note that the 212CD is purpose-built to lie in wait at a critical choke point, surprising an adversary with an ambush with little to no warning.

The armament choices reflect that mission focus. The 212CD retains 533 mm torpedo tubes for heavyweight weapons and mine employment. Germany has aligned the class with an updated heavyweight torpedo path and continues to sponsor the IDAS very short-range, tube-launched missile intended as a self-defence option against ASW helicopters and small craft. There is no organic vertical launch system in the design, so any land-attack or long-range anti-ship missile would require a torpedo tube-launched solution and associated integration. For Canada, that means the 212CD is a stealthy ambush submarine first and a strike platform only if Ottawa decides to fund non-trivial integration work.

Source: www.navalnews.com

One tangible edge of the 212CD worth mentioning is its diamond-shaped outer hull. By replacing the usual circular cross-section with flat, sloped sides, the design reflects incoming active-sonar energy away from the emitter, cutting target-echo strength and shrinking detection ranges, similar to how stealth aircraft avoid radar detection and increasingly relevant as ultra-quiet subs blunt passive detection. TKMS and independent reporting note this shaping is explicitly intended to defeat modern mono- and multistatic active sonars, complementing (not replacing) anechoic coatings and other stealth measures.

South Korea’s KSS-III Batch II

This boat comes from a very different design philosophy. Seoul wanted a domestically controlled, blue-water conventional submarine with a meaningful vertical launch battery. Batch I delivered the baseline. In September 2021 the Republic of Korea demonstrated a successful launch of the Hyunmoo-4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile from the lead boat, which settled any debate about whether the VLS module and ejection sequence work. Batch II expands the architecture to ten VLS cells and incorporates lithium-ion batteries on top of AIP, enhancing submerged endurance and the ability to sustain higher power draws during sprints and evasions. Those are foundational choices if Canada wants a conventional submarine that can do more than lie in wait close to home.

The KSS-III uses a fully digital periscope suite built around non-hull-penetrating optronic masts from Safran, contracted by DSME for the class; Safran’s materials describe these masts as all-electronic sensor heads with multi-channel EO/IR, HDTV imaging, and laser ranging, which aligns with the move away from traditional optical periscopes. Electronic support and communications intelligence are provided by Indra’s Pegaso system, selected for the first Batch II hull and integrated into the submarine’s combat system. The combat management system itself is developed by Hanwha Systems, which serves as the integration backbone for onboard sensors and weapons, including Pegaso. The sonar fit is supplied by LIG Nex1, and Batch II introduces a conformal bow array with more than triple the aperture of the Batch I cylindrical array, along with longer flank arrays, which materially improves both passive sensitivity and active performance.

Size and volume are the other obvious differences. Batch II’s length and displacement figures published by Jane’s and Naval News put the variant at roughly 89 meters and about 3,600 tonnes surfaced, five and a half meters longer than Batch I. The extra volume buys magazine depth, more space for future sensors and unmanned vehicles, and better endurance on station. It also permits a crew and habitability model designed for long patrols. The trade-off is that a larger hull is a little less forgiving in very tight leads or extremely shallow sills.

The weapons architecture is where KSS-III parts company with most Western SSKs. Six 533 mm tubes cover torpedoes, tube-launched anti-ship missiles, and mobile mines, which mirrors European practice. The vertical launch module gives commanders a different playbook. South Korea has proven the cell, and although the ROKN’s SLBM is a national program, the presence of an integrated VLS opens a credible pathway to a conventional land-attack capability via cruise or non-nuclear ballistic missiles. The KSS-III is the first non-nuclear hull in reach that can bring to bear a robust anti-sub, anti-ship, and land attack capability without significant redesign.

For Canadian crews, the KSS-III Batch II’s habitability is a real operational advantage for mixed male and female crews. The larger hull allows for a two-deck layout with separate or configurable berthing, increased privacy, and additional washrooms and showers, which reduces fatigue on long patrols. High automation keeps the core crew around the low-30s, so there is more space per sailor and less friction day to day. Paired with lithium-ion batteries that lengthen quiet endurance between snorts, these features help crews stay rested and effective on longer patrols across three oceans.

The KSS-III Batch II is already in production, with steel already cut and a publicly shown fit that includes a 10-cell VLS and lithium-ion batteries. If Canada signs in 2026, Hanwha says the first boat would arrive around 2032, with four delivered before 2035. The program is domestic today, nine boats for the ROK Navy across three batches, so a Canadian buy would set up the first export sustainment system. That risk is manageable by contract: full technical data and IP access, Canadian-based training pipelines, and a clear division of work between Korean yards and Canadian depots. The remaining concern is fleet commonality, since only two navies would operate the class, but the upside is influence: as the first export customer with up to twelve boats, Canada would hold a strong hand on configuration control and growth options.

What the Two Designs Mean for Canadian Operations

Norway’s and Canada’s “Arctic” are not the same operating problem. Norwegian submarines sail from Haakonsvern near Bergen to the Norwegian and Barents Seas and can be on station quickly. The great-circle distance from Bergen to Tromsø is about 660 nautical miles, and from Tromsø to Longyearbyen on Svalbard, which is Norwegian territory, is roughly 520 nautical miles. Along that coast, warm Atlantic inflow keeps waters largely ice-free year-round, and the Barents Sea has seen pronounced winter ice decline, which shapes patrol patterns around fjords, shelf edges, and chokepoints rather than prolonged under-ice work.

By contrast, Canadian boats leave Halifax or Esquimalt for patrol boxes that are much farther away. Halifax to Iqaluit is about 1,150 nautical miles and Halifax to Resolute Bay nearly 1,980 nautical miles, while an Esquimalt to Beaufort Sea leg to Tuktoyaktuk by sea route is on the order of 3,670 nautical miles. Large parts of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago still retain multi-year ice through summer, which drives different range, endurance, and ice-edge considerations than those built into the German–Norwegian program.

Viewed from Halifax and Esquimalt, the Type 212CD offers a force that makes Canada’s maritime approaches hard for any opponent. The design’s faceted “diamond” outer hull reduces target echo strength under active sonar, complementing very low acoustic signatures and fuel-cell AIP that supports long, quiet waits along shelf breaks and in straits. Its fully digital visuals suite, with twin HENSOLDT optronic masts and the i360 panoramic system, minimizes time and exposure at periscope depth, while the Kongsberg SA9510S Mk II mine-avoidance and bottom-navigation package lowers risk in cluttered, shallow water. These attributes align with a hunter-killer posture in choke points such as the Grand Banks, Cabot Strait, Hecate Strait, and Dixon Entrance, and the KTA “ORCCA” combat system stack is already standardizing across Germany and Norway, which eases NATO integration for Canada.

The drawback emerges when a mission needs organic strike at range. The 212CD is a torpedo-centric SSK, with future tube-launched options possible, but it is not drawn around a vertical launch battery and cannot add one without becoming a different boat. If a patrol box is far from Canada and the task includes land attack or complex multi-axis salvo tactics, that design choice limits options.

The KSS-III flips that calculus for blue-water work. Batch II adds a ten-cell vertical launch module and lithium-ion batteries, which together expand weapon capacity, allow land-attack or anti-ship strikes from covert deep submergence, and improve submerged endurance and sortie pacing. The class is larger than 212CD, with more internal volume and high automation. Hanwha and recent trade press cite a nominal crew in the low 30s, which, combined with the larger hull, improves habitability on 30–60 day trips to distant stations in the Pacific and North Atlantic. These traits are useful when Canada needs a conventional submarine that can hold more weapons, stay longer on station, and influence events at sea and ashore.

Sustainment and schedule are the balancing factors. The 212CD brings an existing European user group and a NATO-standardized combat-system supply chain, which lowers integration friction. KSS-III would require Canada to stand up a bilateral sustainment framework with South Korea, with full data rights and in-country training written into contract from day one, but it buys influence over the export configuration. On schedule, Hanwha publicly states that, if under contract in 2026, it can deliver Canada’s first KSS-III around 2032 and four boats before 2035. This has the added benefit of allowing Canada to dispose of the Victoria class submarines earlier, which could save the Department of National Defence roughly $1 billion.

In short, the German boat brings exceptional stealth shaping, a mature NATO sensor and combat-system ecosystem, and superb choke-point lethality. The Korean boat brings greater weapons volume through VLS, lithium-ion energy for blue-water persistence, more space and automation for crews on long legs, and a vendor-proposed delivery pace that could compress Canada’s transition off Victoria-class.

Recommendation

The KSS-III is the only conventional submarine that can meet all of Canada’s requirements. It combines the blue-water reach and endurance demanded by transoceanic tasking with a vertical launch system that enables credible land-attack and complex anti-surface strike options, supported by lithium-ion batteries that lengthen quiet submerged persistence and improve sortie tempo on distant stations. Its larger hull and higher automation provide the habitability and crew margin needed for 30 to 60 day deployments from Halifax and Esquimalt to the North Atlantic, the Indo-Pacific, and the Arctic ice edge, while remaining within the conventional, non-nuclear profile Canada has set. The design’s modern combat system and sensor suite can be integrated with Canadian and allied command, control, and targeting architectures, and the bilateral sustainment framework required with South Korea can be structured by contract to include full technical data access, in-country training pipelines, and an industrial workshare that anchors through-life support domestically. The delivery cadence proposed for a 2026 award would shorten Canada’s reliance on the Victoria class and reduce associated sustainment exposure during transition, while an initial Canadian order of up to twelve boats would give Ottawa a controlling voice over configuration management, growth paths, and export-variant standards for the life of the class.

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No More Excuses: How Canada Can Reach NATO’s 2% and Keep Going

Canada Can and Must Meet NATO’s Defence Spending Commitments—Here’s how

Much attention has been given to Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent promise to finally meet Canada’s NATO commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on national defence—a target Canada has conspicuously failed to reach since first pledging to do so in 2014. There’s even discussion of increasing this commitment to 5% at an upcoming NATO summit. Historically, Canadian governments—both Liberal and Conservative—have carefully avoided explicitly refusing compliance, instead deflecting attention by emphasizing Canada’s unique contributions to NATO missions and global security efforts.

Indeed, Canada has participated meaningfully in NATO operations over the decades, from missions in the Balkans to recent support efforts in Latvia. Yet, despite these contributions, with the exception of special operations forces, Canada’s military capabilities have eroded significantly, limiting its ability to respond robustly to modern threats.

Various justifications have been provided by governments and analysts for Canada’s reluctance to meet the 2% spending benchmark. Fiscal constraints are frequently cited, with policymakers suggesting defense increases would necessitate politically challenging tax hikes or program cuts. A lack of political will, tied to low voter interest in defense spending, has further allowed successive governments to sidestep meaningful investment. Analysts have also argued that Canada’s geographic proximity and defense alliance with the United States have fostered complacency, reducing urgency for self-reliance. Critics of the 2% figure itself suggest it’s arbitrary and not reflective of actual defense capability, advocating instead for “outcome-based” assessments. Procurement inefficiencies and outdated infrastructure compound these arguments, with the government often indicating increased spending would be ineffective without comprehensive procurement reforms. Additionally, some claim Canada’s defense industry lacks the capacity to absorb rapid funding increases without heavy reliance on imports.

In sum, there is no shortage of excuses, but that’s all they are. Excuses.

It’s a Matter of Choice, Not Cost

Countries much smaller than Canada in both population and GDP like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Albania have all managed to meet or exceed the 2% target. The largest among them is Slovakia with a population of 5.4 million, nominal GDP of $141 billion USD, and a GDP per capita of $25,000 USD. Compare that to Canada, with a population of nearly 41 million, nominal GDP of 2.24 trillion USD, and a GDP per capita of approximately $55,000 USD.

These figures highlight the significant difference in economic scale between the two countries. Despite its smaller economy, Slovakia has managed to meet or exceed the NATO defense spending target of 2% of GDP.

This comparison demonstrates that achieving the NATO benchmark has little to do with the size of a nation’s economy or the cost of such initiatives. Rather, policy decisions and priorities are the culprit.

When politicians and pundits say that Canada can’t afford to meet its NATO commitments, what they are really saying is, we simply don’t want to. Politics and public policy discussions have become chambers of talking points, deflections, and just about anything except for truth and accountability.

To Justin Trudeau’s credit, he was frank with our allies, albeit behind closed doors when he said that Canada had no intention of meeting the 2% spending commitment a little over a year ago. Unfortunately for Trudeau and for Canada, such blatant disregard for Canada’s commitments generated significant animosity among our allies.

Could anyone imagine Trudeau making such a declaration about its Paris climate targets? Surely not. Which brings us back to the one simple point. Increasing defence spending is not a matter of capability. It’s a matter of choice.

Here are some concreate steps Canada can take to increase defence spending quickly, and effectively.

A logical first step would be significantly increasing the salaries of our troops, a measure desperately needed given the rising cost of living. Additionally, Canada’s military recruitment bureaucracy requires immediate and comprehensive reform. During the Afghanistan conflict, some Canadian citizens eager to join the Canadian Armed Forces faced excessive delays—sometimes up to two years. Frustrated, these individuals turned instead to the UK’s Royal Marine Commandos, where their applications were processed and accepted within mere months, placing them quickly into active training overseas. This discrepancy is not due to the UK being less rigorous; rather, it highlights Canada’s overly bureaucratic and inefficient recruiting processes.

Canada should also more readily consider off-the-shelf equipment purchases, a practical approach employed by former Prime Minister Harper with acquisitions like the CC-130J Hercules and C-17 Globemaster aircraft. While long-term investments in Canada’s defense industry remain essential for self-reliance, urgent equipment procurement must prioritize operational effectiveness and troop welfare over domestic job creation. Although supporting local industries is important, it should not lead to decades-long delays and significantly inflated costs for essential military hardware. Canada’s defense procurement strategy must therefore strike a pragmatic balance, ensuring timely and cost-effective outcomes that directly enhance our military capabilities.

What about Canada’s planned purchase of the F-35 Lightening II?

Canada must quickly complete its acquisition of the full complement of 88 F-35 fighters. I understand and support Canada’s growing desire to move away from reliance on the United States for procurement, however, the F-35 is a Joint Fighter program, of which Canada is already an integral member. The contract will provide significant economic advantages, but more importantly, our horrifically slow procurement process means our pilots could be waiting decades instead of years for new jets. Furthermore, modern air defence threats necessitate fight-generation stealth capabilities to protect our pilots. Why send our pilots into harms way in jets that can be detected by radar, and fired upon, when we can supply them with fighters that are much more difficult to detect? Can we please start thinking about the troops? If we want to continue participating in NATO air missions, and we absolutely should, if we want to continue being a reliable ally, then it behooves us to equip our pilots with the very best, and that means the F-35.

To the naysayers that argue the United States has a kill switch, I say hogwash. If the UK, Australia, and several other NATO allies aren’t deterred by this, then neither should we be. Further, I reject the notion that we would ever have to militarily defend ourselves against the United States. Get real folks. That’s just not going to happen.

But what about the Saab Gripen?

We should buy them too!

Incorporating the Saab JAS 39 Gripen E into the Royal Canadian Air Force would enhance Canada’s capability to fight in the air. We are a large country with a large air space. We need a large air force. The Gripen offers a cost-effective, highly capable, and strategically versatile complement to the F-35, enhancing the RCAF’s operational flexibility.

The Gripen is equipped with the MBDA Meteor missile, a beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) with an operational range exceeding 100 kilometers and a no-escape zone over 60 kilometers. This capability enables the Gripen to engage and neutralize threats, such as Russian bombers, from significant distances, enhancing the RCAF’s defensive posture.

Designed for operations in austere environments, the Gripen E can operate from short, unprepared runways and withstand harsh Arctic conditions. This makes it particularly suitable for defending Canada’s vast northern territories, where infrastructure is limited, and rapid response is critical.

Concerns about maintaining multiple fighter platforms are often overstated. Several NATO allies, including the United Kingdom (operating both F-35s and Typhoons), Germany (Typhoons and Tornados), and Norway (F-35s and F-16s), successfully manage mixed fleets. Canada’s robust aerospace sector is well-equipped to handle the logistics and maintenance associated with a diversified fighter fleet.

Integrating the Gripen alongside the F-35 would provide the RCAF with a balanced mix of stealth and versatility, ensuring readiness across a spectrum of missions. This strategic diversification would enhance Canada’s defense capabilities and reaffirm its commitment to NATO obligations.

These are just a few, relatively quick fixes, off the top of my head that can be implemented which would significantly increase the CAF’s capability which would certainly get us to 2% and even beyond.

Over the Long Term

Longer term initiatives like the River class destroyer, and acquisition of 12 submarines will ensure that our defence spending maintains pace with our NATO commitments while significantly enhancing the CAF’s ability to defend itself and its allies.

If Canada re-aligns its priorities, it absolutely can achieve its NATO defence spending commitments. The UK, France, and Germany all spend 2% or more of their GDP on defence, and the last time I checked, all three countries had robust social programs that rival Canada’s.

Recent concerns over Canadian sovereignty demand we act now. We want to be a truly sovereign nation; we must provide a credible military defence capability. Our future, and indeed that of the rest of the word depends on it.

Introducing The Quiet War by Michael J. Lalonde

The Quiet War by Michael J. Lalonde book cover

A new kind of military thriller has arrived—and it’s unapologetically Canadian.

I’m Michael J. Lalonde, a former intelligence officer in the Canadian Armed Forces and former politician, now author of The Quiet War: Canadian Front. Drawing from two decades of experience in intelligence, strategy, and leadership, this debut novel is a deeply authentic, high-stakes story of covert warfare, political tension, and national survival.

Ever wonder what Canada’s special operations and intelligence community can really do when push comes to shove?

The story draws on real-world experience to deliver more than a typical thriller. The Quiet War: Canadian Front doesn’t just entertain—it challenges assumptions. The novel imagines a scenario where Canada is finally forced to act with strength, precision, and resolve, despite years of political drift and underinvestment in national defence. It’s a story grounded in the realities of our capabilities—quiet, disciplined, and deadly when called upon.

“The Quiet War by Michael J. Lalonde is grounded in real-world intelligence, special operations, and high-stakes realism.”
— Richard Tanner

I know what our people are capable of. This story is built on that truth. As the plot unfolds, readers will see just how potent Canada’s elite operators and intelligence professionals can be when our national security is at stake—and how far they’re willing to go to protect our values, even when the country’s political leadership falters.

With The Quiet War: Canadian Front—the first book in a bold new series—I set out to give Canada the centre stage it deserves in this genre.

The novel imagines a deadly international conflict unfolding in Canada’s own backyard. Combining real-world tactics with relentless pacing and complex characters, this book is for readers who crave the authenticity of Tom Clancy, the grit of Mark Greaney, and a voice that finally puts Canada at the centre of the story.

As the world of The Quiet War expands, future installments will continue to spotlight Canada’s role on the global stage while deepening alliances with traditional partners like the United Kingdom. As the threat intensifies, the story will explore how these nations respond—not just through diplomacy, but through joint military and intelligence operations. Expect to see new characters emerge, strategic tensions rise, and national leaders pushed to their limits. The series will grow in scale and complexity, but its foundation will remain grounded in courage, loyalty, and national resolve.

Want to explore more? Start here for author FAQs or click here to dive into a full description of The Quiet War: Canadian Front.

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Join the mission early. Get the first chapter free—and step into a world of special operations, military intelligence, political intrigue, and global stakes unlike anything you’ve seen in Canadian fiction.

Book Review: Play Dumb by Cole Chase

Play Dumb by Cole Chase is the second installment of his latest series, The Valiant Thrillogy. It is a gripping and high-octane sequel that delivers relentless action, razor-sharp dialogue, and a masterfully woven web of cyber warfare, political intrigue, and personal stakes. Cole Chase crafts a thriller that balances pulse-pounding tension with intelligent storytelling, keeping the reader hooked from the very first page.

The novel’s pacing is impeccable, seamlessly blending high-stakes heists, digital warfare, and close-quarters combat. Every chapter is infused with a sense of urgency, making it impossible to put down. The action is visceral and immersive, showcasing meticulous attention to tactical realism while never losing sight of the emotional weight behind every move.

The characters are equally compelling, each bringing their own strengths, flaws, and motivations to the table. Quinn Richards stands out as a leader forced to navigate increasingly dangerous waters, his sharp wit and strategic mind constantly tested by powerful adversaries. The supporting cast shines, with dynamic personalities that add depth to the story, making every victory hard-earned and every setback deeply felt.

Beyond the action, Play Dumb excels in its exploration of power, deception, and the evolving nature of modern conflict. It delves into the intersections of technology, politics, and personal ambition, creating a thriller that feels as timely as it is exhilarating. The cyber-warfare elements are particularly well-executed, demonstrating a clear understanding of how digital battles are fought in today’s world.

Cole Chase has crafted a sequel that not only meets the high bar set by its predecessor but raises it even further. Smart, intense, and deeply satisfying, Play Dumb is a must-read for fans of high-tech espionage, strategic thrillers, and action-packed storytelling.

Book Review: Cold Hit by Cole Chase

Cole Chase’s Cold Hit is the first installment of his latest series, The Valiant Thrillogy, which follows his previous series, The Skyhaus Thrillogy, chronicling the adventures of Shadowfast, a covert heist crew operating under the guise of a heavy metal band specializing in cons, cyber-infiltration, and high-stakes deception. It’s a high-stakes thriller with relentless fast pacing that plunges headfirst into a story of cyber warfare, espionage, and modern heist tactics. The story delivers a mix of tense action sequences, elaborate cons, and sharp, humorous dialogue.

At the story’s heart is Quinn Richards, a witty team leader who operates in the grey. Each member of Quinn’s crew brings a distinct skill set and personality, which adds depth to the novel’s fast-moving narrative. Its greatest strength is the blending of humour-filled camaraderie and tension, making the characters more than just archetypal operatives in a high-tech game. As a retired Army veteran, I found the witty camaraderie among the characters especially resonant, reminding me of the close bonds and banter that are hard to replace after leaving the service. Even amidst the high-octane thrills, the dynamic between the team felt like home—a rare and welcome feeling for those who have experienced that kind of brotherhood firsthand.

Chase’s writing is intelligent and engaging, layering technical details without losing the plot’s momentum. The book explores the vulnerabilities of digital infrastructure, the influence of private organizations on law enforcement, and the terrifying ease with which information can be weaponized, making the story relevant and engaging to read. The novel concludes with a gripping cliffhanger that leaves readers eager for the next installment. However, it doesn’t feel like a frustrating gut punch, as Chase’s rapid publishing cycle ensures a quick payoff. With the second book set for release in March 2025 and the third following in April, readers won’t have to wait long to continue the story—something I’m personally looking forward to.

The book’s complexity regarding cybersecurity and system infiltration runs a slight risk of being overwhelming for readers unfamiliar with the subject, though this is likely by design, making it an appealing read for fans of technothrillers. The relentless pacing is exhilarating; however, it leaves little room for deeper introspection and character exploration, sacrificing a degree of emotional depth for gripping twists and revelations. Overall, Cold Hit is a compelling and intelligent read that marries action with sharp social commentary. Chase provides us a world where trust is a currency and information is the ultimate weapon while keeping readers on edge throughout the story. The novel is ideal for fans of fast-moving espionage thrillers with a healthy blend of Ocean’s Eleven. I rate this a solid 4.8 out of 5.

Is There a Diplomatic Solution to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?

The crisis in Ukraine features Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s ambitions versus the will of the entire population of Ukraine. Unfortunately, it appears that Putin and Ukraine have irreconcilable differences which will make it extremely difficult for a diplomatic solution in the foreseeable future. Here’s why.

The unprovoked, illegal, and vendetta driven Russian invasion of Ukraine may prove to be Putin’s end. Unlike the Soviet Union, Putin subscribes to no over arching ideology or world view, rather he is single-mindedly motivated by pride and nostalgia for an empire long dead. On the surface, his invasion appears motivated by a quest for power. Certainly, his stated objectives of preventing genocide and Nazification of Ukraine are laughable. But what of the conventional wisdom that Russia is perpetually insecure about the prospects of its own security? Surely this can’t be Putin’s motivation. After all, Russian estimates of Ukrainian military capability were so low that Putin thought a force of 150,000 soldiers could easily topple Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government after two days, evidenced by Russian state-owned domestic media outlet RIA’s embarrassing and premature declaration of victory story published on 26 February 2022 and subsequently deleted.

The RIA article proclaimed, “now this problem is gone – Ukraine has returned to Russia,” although it does not appear that Ukraine has any intention of voluntarily “returning” to Putin’s fantasized empire. The article claims that Ukraine’s return was “inevitable, asking how the ‘old European capitals’ could ‘seriously believe Moscow would give up Kyiv.’” This provides a rare glimpse into the personal machinations of Vladimir Putin – the existence of Ukraine as a sovereign and independent state is a problem for him, one that he clearly refuses to let go of. But why invade Ukraine now?

According to former MI6 director Sir John Sawer, when Putin first established his dictatorship in early 2000, he “set about modernizing and reforming Russia in a sensible direction.” However, the pro-democracy coloured revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) appeared to change his thinking. He abandoned reforms in favour of strong central state control with an aim of using revenues from soaring oil and gas prices to fund government services to the people of Russia. Putin maintained his grip on power by increasing the standard of living in many parts of Russia; however, following the collapse of energy prices in 2014 this was no longer possible. As Sawer put it, “the deal used to be, you leave us in power, and we’ll deliver growing services to you.” After 2014, “increasingly, Putin’s deal with the Russian people was – you leave us in power, and we will restore Russia’s greatness.” Not everyone agrees. Eight days before Putin’s invasion, international relations theorist John Mearsheimer argued that the West “recently created the narrative that Russia is bent on creating a greater Russia, or the second coming of the Soviet Union.” Although RIA’s premature victory post supports the Sawer thesis, Mearsheimer highlights an important point: during Barrack Obama’s administration the United States avoided sending lethal aid to Ukraine. Donald Trump reversed that policy, and Joe Biden followed suit.

But why wait until now? Why not invade shortly after Trump reversed course on lethal aid? Following the Russian Armed Forces’ abysmal performance in the Georgia invasion, Putin undertook a massive modernization program for the Russian military. During the Syrian civil war, Putin tried to ensure that as many personnel as possible gained valuable combat experience, something the United States has in abundance, but Russia lacked.

Putin likely believed that the Russian military wasn’t sufficiently ready until recently. Given the size and scope of the invasion and his pre-positioning of Russian forces along the Ukrainian border, inside Belarus, Crimea, and amphibious forces at sea, Putin has been planning an invasion for a long time. This decision wasn’t made on a whim. His pre-invasion demands that Ukraine not be permitted to join NATO could never be accepted by the West, and Putin must have known this. When following the lead-up to the invasion I thought Putin had backed himself into a corner in making those demands. In hindsight, I think he purposefully made demands he knew would be rejected so he could continue with his invasion. For Putin, regaining Russian dominance over Ukraine is central to his grip on power. There is little evidence to suggest that Putin can be deterred from this agenda, aside from a military defeat.

Conversely, Ukraine’s aspirations of joining NATO have been enshrined within its constitution. Moreover, it wants to join the European Union. Most importantly, Ukraine wants to maintain its sovereign independence. Ukraine, along with the West, refuses to recognize Russia’s claim over Crimea, nor the independence of the Donbas region. Ukraine’s population fiercely supports democracy and freedom and refuses to be subject to Russian oversight or control.

Ukraine has a long history of being dominated and occupied by foreign powers, first by the Russian Czar, then the Soviet Union, then Hitler, then the Soviet Union again. It has an equally long history of mistrust of authority and resistance. In historian Yuval Noah Harari’s view, this mistrust and resistance is the “essence of being a Ukrainian.” Ukraine’s fierce defence against overwhelming Russian firepower is proof enough. This epic defence of freedom and independence against Russia is personified by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whose wartime performance has been nothing short of heroic.

Putin’s plan to re-exert Russian control over Ukraine is now key to his own survival. Putin’s center of gravity has been his perceived strength and strategic brilliance. To be fair, Putin has done a reasonably good job of maintaining this perception up until recently. Putin and Russia emerged in a stronger strategic position following Putin’s military engagements in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, and the Syrian Civil War. That is not to say that I support his actions, certainly not. It demonstrates a long pattern of brutal oppression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. His invasion of Ukraine is no exception. The exception lies in the fact that it is now impossible for Putin and Russia to emerge from the Ukrainian invasion in a stronger strategic position from where it started, especially if he fails in his quest to conquer Ukrainians. Even if he does initially acquire control over Ukraine, he will not be able to maintain it. Although the Russian Armed Forces are stronger than the Ukrainian military in size and firepower, it is not nearly powerful enough to maintain control over a population of 44 million people bent on resisting Russian control.

If Putin loses in Ukraine, and one way or another, he likely will, his tenure as Russian president is over. If he is removed from office, his own life may very well be in jeopardy. Putin will likely come to realize this, and based on previous experience with military setbacks, he will likely double down with more violent brutality against Ukrainian civilians. He is highly unlikely to abandon his quest for Ukrainian domination. His very survival depends on his success. Ukraine on the other hand cannot agree to Putin’s demands of abolishing the Zelenskyy government, surrendering sovereign control to Russia, or surrendering its right to self-determination in its international affairs. This is not to say that there are no viable diplomatic solutions, rather, that such solutions are highly unlikely to be agreed upon by either party.

I pray that it is the latter, and not the former that prevails, but prayers are often not enough. Although Putin will likely lose in the end, his defeat will probably come after the destruction of Ukrainian cities, and the loss of countless lives.

The Ukrainian people have fought with stunning bravery and conviction in the name of freedom and democracy at a time when the world appeared to be retreating from those virtues while much of the West was preoccupied with its enthusiastic downward spiral of self-loathing. It behooves us to do everything possible to ensure that Ukraine is not defeated. Sanctions alone cannot save Ukraine.

The Canadian Government Failed Its Afghan Allies

Facebook A Soldiers Hard Look Back At Canadas Afghan Mission

When Canadian special forces first entered Afghanistan in late 2001, we and our allies had very little intelligence on the region, its people, the culture, or the languages. Canadians had to rely on local assistance to build an initial intelligence picture and to plan operations. In those early days of clearing out Al-Qaeda terrorists from mountain strongholds where they took refuge, local support from Afghans saved Canadian lives.

The relationship between the Canadian Armed Forces and local Afghans continued to build over the years. It reached a pinnacle with Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin’s decision to deploy thousands of Canadian troops in a combat role to the birthplace of the Taliban – Kandahar, in 2005. At the time Kandahar was considered the most dangerous place in Afghanistan and one of the most dangerous places on earth.

Upon our arrival to Kandahar we immediately started to build up the Kandahar Air Field (KAF) and used it as our operational headquarters. Many Afghans risked their lives by taking employment to help build the KAF, serve as interpreters, educate our intelligence staff, and fill other roles vital to the success of our operations. They also made introductions to key stakeholders and facilitated our relationship building efforts with a myriad of tribal leaders.

All of these activities by local Afghans helped save Canadian lives, while putting targets on their own backs. Many brave Afghans lost their lives in targeted assassinations by Taliban murderers.

They knew the risks, but they chose to help us anyway because they believed in Canada, and because they believed in our joint effort to build a better Afghanistan for everyone. Unfortunately, the events of the past few weeks suggest that their faith in Canada may have been misplaced.

Although nobody in the allied intelligence community anticipated the Afghan government would collapse immediately following the American departure, every allied intelligence agency agreed that Afghanistan would fall to the Taliban and do so quickly. These reports were made available to government leaders including our own Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as early as May 2021.

Despite the early warnings Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government took no action, waited until the last possible minute, and was left scrambling to offer token evacuation services to our Afghan brethren that is too little and too late. Trudeau himself stated that it would now be impossible to evacuate the more than 6000 Afghan allies that remain trapped in Afghanistan because the Taliban are blocking access to the airport.

What does this say to our soldiers and veterans who made connections with the Afghans who served with us and risked their lives for us. God knows our military is already suffering a serious morale crisis due to lack of action our government took on sexual misconduct in the military. Was this really the time to dither on yet another crisis of our own making?

National leaders absolutely cannot afford to wait until the last minute to act when lives are at stake. That’s not leadership. In addition to forfeiting the lives of the thousands of Afghans that helped Canada, Trudeau’s delays have gravely damaged Canada’s national interests.

Should the need arise for Canada to once again send its troops into harms way anytime soon, how likely is it that the local population will trust us? How willing will they be to risk their lives based on false promises from a country that has proven that political expediency trumps their lives? When we fail to protect our allies or honour our commitments, we catastrophically erode our reputation. Such an erosion would undermine the efforts of our diplomats and military placing the success of any new mission at risk and ultimately will cost more Canadian lives.

If Canada wants to be seen as a serious nation on the world stage it needs to start acting like it. We can no longer afford to take a laissez-faire attitude towards our international and military affairs. The world has changed dramatically in the past 10 years. The United States under both Donald Trump and Joe Biden have proven that they are no longer interested in playing a leadership role. Now more than ever, we must dispense of our culture of complacency on matters outside our borders and take these issues more seriously.

If Canada doesn’t step up, who will?